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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of content
distribution in wireless peer-to-peer networks where
all nodes are selfish and non-cooperative. We propose
a model that considers both the broadcast nature of
wireless channels and the incentives of nodes, where
each node aims to increase its own download rate and
reduce its upload rate through the course of content
distribution. We then propose a protocol for these
selfish nodes to exchange contents. Our protocol is dis-
tributed and does not require the exchange of money,
reputation, etc., and hence can be easily implemented
without additional infrastructure. Moreover, we show
that our protocol can be easily modified to employ
network coding.
The performance of our protocol is studied. We
derive a closed-form expression of Nash Equilibriums
when there are only two files in the system. The prices
of anarchy, both from each node’s perspective and
the whole system’s perspective, are also characterized.
Moreover, we propose a distributed mechanism where
each node adjusts its strategies only based on local
information and show that the mechanism converges
to a Nash Equilibrium. We also introduce an approach
for calculating Nash Equilibriums for systems that
incorporate network coding when there are more than
two files.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is known that using wireless peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks to distribute information locally can im-
prove the system performance in many different
aspects. For example, in cellular networks, nearby
mobile devices can exchange data with each other
instead of contacting the faraway base station for
the data. Since exchanging data with nearby devices
requires much less power and results in less interfer-
ence to other devices, such an approach may reduce
power consumption and increase spatial reuse.
Many existing studies (e.g., [1]–[3]) have demon-
strated the benefits of wireless P2P networks. How-
ever, these studies have assumed that all nodes
are cooperative. In practice, nodes may be selfish.
Therefore, a major challenge for P2P networks is
to provide incentives to nodes in the network so
that they are willing to contribute to the network
by transmitting data that they possess. While there
are a lot of studies, such as [4]–[6], on this topic
for P2P networks over Internet, these works cannot
be applied to wireless P2P networks. Due to the
broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, when
a node transmits a packet, all nodes within the
proximity are able to receive the packet. Therefore,
in wireless P2P networks, data exchange involves all
nodes within the system, rather than only two nodes
as in P2P networks over Internet.
In this paper, we study wireless P2P networks
composed of selfish nodes. We first provide a model
that considers the broadcast nature of wireless trans-
missions and the incentives of selfish nodes. Each
node in the system aims to increase its download
rate and decrease its upload rate, so as to reduce
its own power consumption. We then propose a
protocol for content distribution in these wireless
P2P networks. Our protocol does not require the
exchange of money, reputation, etc., and hence can
be implemented without the need of additional in-
frastructure. This non-monetary feature further dis-
tinguishes our work from other studies that rely on
additional infrastructure to set prices or payoffs [6]–
[8], or to punish uncooperative nodes [9]. Moreover,
our protocol can be easily modified to employ net-
work coding.
The performance of our protocol is studied. When
there are only two files in the system, we show that
there are closed-form expressions for each node’s
strategies under a series of Nash Equilibriums. We
also derive the prices of anarchy under these Nash
Equilibriums, both from a node’s selfish perspective
and the whole system’s perspective.
To compute its strategy under a Nash Equilibrium,
a node needs information of all other nodes, which
is not always available to the node. To address
this challenge, we propose a distributed mechanism
where each node updates its strategy only based on
its private information and the history of the system.
We show that this distributed mechanism converges
to a Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, this mechanism
is also consistent with each node’s incentive, as
the expected cost of each node reduces with each
update.
We then consider systems that have more than
two files and employ network coding. We propose
a systematic approach to compute the Nash Equilib-
riums. The performance of such systems are further
investigated through numerical studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II proposes our system model and protocol
for content distribution. Section III studies the Nash
Equilibriums for systems with only two files. Section
IV studies the prices of anarchy under these Nash
Equilibriums. Section V discusses implementation
issues and provides a distributed mechanism for
nodes to update their strategies. Section VI studies
the Nash Equilibriums when there are more than two
files in systems that employ network coding. Section
VII provides some numerical results. Finally, Section
VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
Consider a system with a number of wireless
nodes that share a set of files or video/audio
streams. We assume that each file, or stream, is
composed of infinitely many packets. This assump-
tion is natural when nodes share a set of streams.
In scenarios where nodes share a set of files, this
assumption is a good approximation when the size
of each file is at least several MBytes, or, consists
of at least thousands of packets. We denote the set
of nodes by N , and the set of files, or streams, by
X = {A,B,C, . . . }. We assume that each node needs
to download one file from other peers, and holds all
packets of all the other files. One way to enforce this
assumption is by requiring each node to download
all but one files through, say, its own 3G connection
before admitting the node into the system. We use
Xn to denote the file that client needs. For example,
if Xn = B, then node n needs to download B from
its peers, and have all data of files A,C,D, . . . . In
this paper, we use upper-case letters to represent
files and lower-case letters to represent nodes. When
the file that a node needs is not important in the
context, we use n,m, etc., to denote a node. On
the other hand, when we want to stress that the
indicated node needs a certain file, say, file A, we
use ai to denote the node.
Most protocols for peer-to-peer content distribu-
tion involves the data exchange between two peers.
However, those protocols may not be directly ap-
plicable to wireless broadcast networks. In wireless
networks, all transmissions are carried by the shared
wireless medium. We assume that, when a node
transmits a packet from a file, all nodes receive
this packet. The broadcasting nature of wireless
transmissions may result in a “free rider” problem
as depicted in the following example.
Example 1: Consider a system with four nodes
and two files where X1 = X2 = A and X3 = X4 =
B. Suppose that node 1 and node 3 exchange data,
that is, node 1 transmits packets of B, and node
3 transmits packets of A in return. As all nodes
can receive all transmissions, node 2 and node 4
can obtain packets of A and B without making any
transmissions. Therefore, we say that node 2 and
node 4 are free riders.
In addition to being unfair, the presence of free
riders may prevent nodes from transmitting data
and contributing to the networks when all nodes are
selfish. In the above example, each node may refrain
from transmitting data, in the hope that other nodes
participate in exchanging data, making itself a free
rider.
In this paper, we propose a non-monetary protocol
for P2P content distribution and study its perfor-
mance when all nodes are selfish. Before introducing
the protocol, we first formally describe the goal of
each node.
We define the time needed for transmitting a data
packet to be one unit time. We assume that the goal
of a node is to increase its download rate and to
reduce the number of transmissions it makes. To
be more specific, we assume that whenever node n
transmits a data packet, it needs to pay a transmis-
sion cost of gn. The transmission cost can be chosen
to, for example, reflect the amount of power needed
for making a transmission. On the other hand, node
n pays a waiting cost at rate wn per unit time through
the course of the protocol. Suppose that, a node
n receives two needed packets at time t1 and t2,
respectively. During time [t1, t2], node n transmits
a total number of αn packets. Thus, to download
the packet at time t2, node n waits a total amount
of t2 − t1 time, and makes αn transmissions. The
total cost for the packet that node n downloads at
t2 can then be expressed as αngn + (t2 − t1)wn. The
average total cost of node n is then defined as the
long-term average total cost per downloaded packet.
The following example explains the computation of
average total cost.
Example 2: Suppose a node n downloads a total
number of dn(t) packets that it needs, and transmits
un(t) packets, during time [0, t]. The average total
cost of node n is then lim supt→∞
un(t)gn+twn
dn(t)
.
We assume that the goal of node n is to minimize
its average total cost. Node n wishes to reduce
lim supt→∞
un(t)
dn(t)
in order to achieve small transmis-
sion cost. On the other hand, the download rate of
node n can be expressed as lim inft→∞
dn(t)
t , which
is the inverse of lim supt→∞
t
dn(t)
. Therefore, to have
high download rate, node n also wishes to have
small lim supt→∞
t
dn(t)
.
We now describe our protocol for P2P content
distribution. The process is composed of rounds,
where two nodes transmit two packets that each
other needs in each round. At the beginning of a
round, each node n secretly and randomly picks a
backoff timer, tn. Node n then waits and listens to
Fig. 1: An example of a round.
the channel for tn time. If no transmissions take
place in tn time, node n transmits a control packet
that contains its value of Xn. This control packet is
interpreted as a promise from node n saying that
if any node transmits a packet of Xn, node n will
respond with a packet that n has. As the length
of this control packet is much smaller than a data
packet, we assume that time needed for transmitting
the control packet is negligible and node n does not
pay transmission cost for the control packet. After
node n transmits the control packet, every node m
that has the file Xn secretly and randomly picks a
backoff timer tˆm. Node m waits and listens to the
channel for tˆm time. If no other nodes transmit in
tˆm time, node m transmits a data packet of Xn, and
piggybacks its value of Xm. Upon receiving the data
packet from node m, node n responds with a packet
of Xm, as promised in its control packet. The round
ends after node n responds the packet and a new
round begins.
As explained in the previous paragraph, there are
two phases of backoffs in a round, one for a node to
transmit a control packet, and the other for a node
to respond to the control packet by transmitting a
data packet. We call the two phases of backoffs the
initiation phase and the response phase, respectively.
Figure 1 shows an example of a round.
Intuitively, when a node n chooses a large value of
tn and tˆn, it is likely that node n does not transmit,
which increases its chance of being a free rider and
reduces its transmission cost. However, a large value
of tn and tˆn also means that node n may need to
wait a long time before receiving a packet it needs,
which results in large waiting cost. By taking waiting
costs into account, our protocol encourages nodes
to choose reasonable small value of tn and tˆn, and
hence enables data exchange among nodes. We also
note that this protocol is non-monetary and can be
easily implemented for modern wireless networks
without the need of additional infrastructure.
Finally, we show that our protocol can be mod-
ified to incorporate network coding. The modified
protocol is very similar to the one shown in Fig.
1. The only difference is that, in the last part of a
round, when node n sends a data packet, it sends
a coded packet that contains one packet of each file
that it has. For example, suppose that there are three
files A,B,C in the system, and Xn = A, then client
n sends a data packet containing (one packet of
B)+(one packet of C) after it receives a packet of A
from m. Since we assume that every node possesses
all but one files, the coded packet sent by n can be
decoded by every client that needs either file B or
file C. By using network coding, we guarantee that
every client in the system obtains one packet in each
round. Also, since clients that possess neither file B
nor file C cannot decode the packet sent by n, this
approach also prevents clients that need more than
one files from joining the system.
A. Performance Evaluation
Under our protocol, each selfish node’s strategy
consists of two parts: choosing a distribution to gen-
erate its backoff timer in the initiation phase, tn, and
choosing a distribution to generate its backoff timer
in the response phase, tˆn. We say that the strategies
of all nodes in the system form a Nash Equilibrium
if, for each node n, its strategy minimizes its average
total cost, given the strategies of all other nodes.
In the following sections, we analyze the per-
formance of our protocol under Nash Equilibriums.
We consider the performance from both nodes’ per-
spectives and the system’s perspective. A node’s
performance is simply based on its average total
cost. On the other hand, we consider the system’s
performance by its per-node average throughput,
defined as the average download rate over all clients.
We also define the price of anarchy on node cost and
price of anarchy on system throughput as follows:
Definition 1: The price of anarchy on node cost of
a node n under a Nash Equilibrium is the ratio of the
average total cost of n under the Nash Equilibrium
and the minimum possible average total cost of n
when all nodes are cooperative.
Definition 2: The price of anarchy on system
throughput under a Nash Equilibrium is defined as
(maximum possible per-node throughput)
(per-node throughput under the Nash Equilibrium)
.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUMS FOR BILATERAL FILE
EXCHANGES
In this section, we analyze the performance of
our protocol when there are only two files in the
system. In such a system, we can divide nodes
into two groups, nodes in one group, indexed by
a1, a2, . . . , aI , have the file B and need the file A,
that is, Xai = A, while nodes in the other group,
indexed by b1, b2, . . . , bJ have Xbj = B. In this
setting, network coding is not employed.
We will show that there is a series of Nash Equilib-
riums where each node n chooses each of its backoff
timers in the initiation phase and response phase
as an exponential random variable. We focus on
exponential random variables due to its memoryless
property, which makes it easily implementable.
Our analysis is based on the following theorem:
Theorem 1: [10, Lemma 3.1] The strategies of
nodes in a game form a Nash Equilibrium if, for
each node n, given the strategies of other nodes,
the expected cost of node n is the same regardless
of its chosen values of backoff timers.
We first consider the nodes’ strategies on choosing
the backoff timers in the response phase, tˆn. Without
loss of generality, we assume that node b1 has sent
the control packet in the initiation phase. Each
node ai secretly and randomly chooses a backoff
timer tˆai . Assume that the timer chosen by node
ai∗ is the smallest among all backoff timers, that is,
tˆai∗ = min{tˆa1 , tˆa2 , . . . }. Node ai∗ will transmit after
time tˆai∗ , and the additional waiting time, which is
the length of the response phase, for each node ai
to download a packet is tˆai∗ . In the expression of the
additional waiting time, we exclude the time needed
waiting for b1 to transmit its control packet and the
time needed for transmitting data packets, as these
times are not influenced by the values of tˆai . In the
following, we also exclude the waiting cost incurred
by the time waiting for b1 to transmit its control
packet and the time needed for transmitting data
packets when discussing additional waiting cost and
additional total cost.
We show that there is a Nash Equilibrium where
each node ai chooses its backoff timer as an expo-
nential random variable. In particular, we assume
that tˆai ∼ EXP (λai), where the value of λai will be
determined in the sequel.
We now apply Theorem 1 to determine the values
of λai . Suppose that node ai∗ chooses tˆai∗ = t. If t
is smaller than all tˆai , i 6= i
∗, that is, t < mini 6=i∗ tˆai ,
node ai∗ needs to transmit a packet after waiting
for t units of time, and thus the additional total cost
for node ai∗ on this packet is gai∗ + wai∗ t. On the
other hand, if t > mini 6=i∗ tˆai , a node other than ai∗
transmits the packet, and node ai∗ becomes the free
rider. In this case, the additional total cost of node
ai∗ on this packet is wai∗ (mini 6=i∗{tˆai}). Note that we
have mini 6=i∗{tˆai} ∼ EXP (
∑
i 6=i∗ λai). Let λ−i∗ :=∑
i 6=i∗ λai . The expected additional total cost of node
i∗ can be written as:
∫ t
s=0
wai∗ sλ−i∗e
−λ−i∗sds
+
∫ ∞
s=t
(gai∗ + wai∗ t)λ−i∗e
−λ−i∗sds
=
wai∗
λ−i∗
+ e−λ−i∗ t(gai∗ −
wai∗
λ−i∗
). (1)
Thus, if gai =
wai
λ−i
, for all i, the strategies form a
Nash Equilibrium. This can be done by choosing
λai =
1
I − 1
∑
k
wak
gak
−
wai
gai
, (2)
where I is the number of nodes in group
{a1, a2, . . . }. We can also conclude that the expected
value of mini{tˆai}, which is the expected duration of
the response phase, given that a node in the group
{b1, b2, . . . } transmits the control packet, is
TˆA :=
1∑
i λai
=
I − 1∑
iwai/gai
, (3)
and that the expected additional total cost of node
ai is gai .
Similarly, if a node ai transmits a control packet,
each node bj selects tˆbj ∼ EXP (λbj ), where
λbj =
1
J − 1
∑
k
wbk
gbk
−
wbj
gbj
. (4)
The expected duration of the response phase is
TˆB :=
1∑
j λbj
=
J − 1∑
j wbj/gbj
, (5)
and the expected additional total cost of node bj is
gbj .
Next, we consider the choice of backoff timer in
the initiation phase, that is, the choice of tn for a
node n. We will show that there is a Nash Equilib-
rium where each node ai selects tai ∼ EXP (γai )
and each node bj selects tbj ∼ EXP (γbj ).
Assume that a node, say, node ai∗, selects tai∗ = t.
If t is the smallest timer among all timers, that is, t <
mini 6=i∗ tai and t < minj tbj , node ai∗ transmits the
control packet after time t. After which time, it needs
to wait one of the nodes in {b1, b2, . . . } to respond
with a data packet, and then ai∗ needs to transmit
a data packet. By the analysis above, we know that
the expected time that ai∗ waits for one of the nodes
in {b1, b2, . . . } to respond is TˆB . Thus, the expected
total cost for node ai∗ is gai∗ +wai∗ (t+ TˆB) + 2wai∗ ,
where the last term, 2wai∗ , accounts for the waiting
cost caused by transmission delays, as it takes two
units time to transmit two data packets.
Next, consider the case that t >
min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj}. We have that mini 6=i∗ tai ∼
EXP (
∑
i 6=i∗ γai) and minj tbj ∼ EXP (
∑
j γbj ). By
the memoryless property of exponential functions,
we have that
PA\{i∗}<B
:=Prob{min
i 6=i∗
tai < min
j
tbj |t > min{min
i 6=i∗
tai ,min
j
tbj}}
=
∑
i 6=i∗ γai∑
i 6=i∗ γai +
∑
j γbj
.
That is, with probability PA\{i∗}<B, one of the nodes
in {a1, a2, . . . } other than ai∗ transmits the control
packet, and ,with probability 1 − PA\{i∗}<B , one
of the nodes in {b1, b2, . . . } transmits the control
packet. If it is the former case, node ai∗ does not
need to transmit any packets, and its expected
cost is wai∗ (min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj} + TˆB + 2).
If it is the later case, the expected cost is
wai∗ (min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj} + 2) + gai∗ , since
we have shown that the expected additional
total cost of ai∗ is gai∗ . Hence, given that
t > min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj}, the expected
cost is wai∗ (min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj} + 2) +
PA\{i∗}<Bwai∗ TˆB + (1− PA\{i∗}<B)gai∗ .
As we have min{mini 6=i∗ tai ,minj tbj} ∼
EXP (
∑
i 6=i∗ γai +
∑
j γbj ), by letting
γ−i∗ :=
∑
i 6=i∗ γai +
∑
j γbj , the expected cost
of ai∗ can be computed as:∫ t
s=0
[wai∗ (s+ 2) + PA\{i∗}<Bwai∗ TˆB ]γ−i∗e
−γ−i∗sds
+
∫ t
s=0
[(1− PA\{i∗}<B)gai∗ ]γ−i∗e
−γ−i∗sds
+
∫ ∞
s=t
(gai∗ + wai∗ (t+ TˆB) + 2wai∗ )γ−i∗e
−γ−i∗sds
=
wai∗
γ−i∗
+
∑
i 6=i∗ γai
γ−i∗
wai∗ TˆB +
∑
j γbj
γ−i∗
gai∗ + 2wai∗
+e−γ−i∗ t(
∑
j γbj
γ−i∗
wai∗ TˆB +
∑
i 6=i∗ γai
γ−i∗
gai∗ −
wai∗
γ−i∗
).
(6)
We wish to find {γa1 , γa2 , . . . , γb1 , γb2 , . . . } so that
the expected cost of ai∗ is the same for all t. Hence,
we require that
(1− PA\{i∗}<B)wai∗ TˆB + PA\{i∗}<Bgai∗ =
wai∗
γ−i∗
(7)
⇔ (
∑
j
γbj )TˆBwai∗ + (
∑
i 6=i∗
γai)gai∗ = wai∗ (8)
⇔
wai∗
gai∗
=
∑
i 6=i∗ γai
1− (
∑
j γbj )TˆB
, (9)
for all ai∗ . Similarly, by studying the expected cost
of a node bj∗ , we also require that
wbj∗
gbj∗
=
∑
j 6=j∗ γbj
1− (
∑
i γai)TˆA
, (10)
for all bj∗.
Summing the (9) over all ai∗ and we have∑
i
wai
gai
=
(I − 1)
∑
i γai
1− (
∑
j γbj )TˆB
(11)
⇔(
∑
i
γaj )TˆA + (
∑
j
γbj )TˆB = 1. (12)
Assume that (
∑
i γaj )TˆA = α and (
∑
j γbj )TˆB =
1 − α, for some α ∈ (0, 1). Using (9) and (11), we
obtain
γai∗ =
∑
i
γai −
∑
i 6=i∗
γai = α(
∑
i wai/gai
I − 1
−
wai∗
gai∗
).
(13)
Similarly, we also obtain
γbj∗ = (1− α)(
∑
j wbj/gbj
J − 1
−
wbj∗
gbj∗
). (14)
It is easy to check that, for every α ∈ (0, 1), setting
γai and γbj according to (13) and (14) satisfies (9)
and (10) for all nodes, and the expected cost of each
node is the same regardless the actual backoff timer
it chooses. Hence, (13) and (14) form a Nash Equi-
librium. Further, as α can be any number in (0, 1),
this game has infinitely many Nash Equilibriums.
We summarize our results for systems with only
two files in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For any α ∈ (0, 1), if each node ai∗
chooses tai∗ ∼ EXP (γai∗ ) and tˆai∗ ∼ EXP (λai∗ ),
and each node bj∗ chooses tbj∗ ∼ EXP (βbj∗ ) and
tˆbj∗ ∼ EXP (λbj∗ ), where γai∗ , λai∗ , γbj∗ , and λbj∗
are chosen by (13), (2), (14), and (4), then these
strategies form a Nash Equilibrium.
IV. PRICE OF ANARCHY FOR BILATERAL FILE
EXCHANGES
We have found Nash Equilibriums for our protocol
when there are only two files in the system. We now
discuss the performances of these Nash Equilibriums.
Suppose all nodes choose their backoff
timers according to Theorem 2, for some
α ∈ (0, 1). The duration of the initiation phase is
min{ta1 , ta2 , . . . , tb1 , tb2 , . . . }, which is an exponential
random variable with mean
TA,B :=
1∑
i γai +
∑
j γbj
. (15)
Also, the probability that one of the nodes in group
{a1, a2, . . . } transmits the control packet is
Prob{min
i
tai < min
j
tbj} =
∑
i γai∑
i γai +
∑
j γbj
. (16)
Using (3) and (5), we can express the expected
amount of time for the two groups of nodes to
exchange two packets as
TA,B +
∑
i γai∑
i γai +
∑
j γbj
TˆB +
∑
j γbj∑
i γai +
∑
j γbj
TˆA + 2
= TˆA + TˆB + 2, (17)
where the last term in the equation accounts for
the time needed for transmitting two packets. Since
every node downloads a packet in each round, the
per-node average throughput of our protocol is then
1/(TˆA + TˆB + 2) packets per unit time under the
described Nash Equilibriums. On the other hand,
the download rate of a client is at most 0.5 packet
per unit time, and the maximum possible per-node
throughput is 0.5. Therefore, the price of anarchy
on system throughput is (TˆA + TˆB + 2)/2. To better
understand the price of anarchy on system through-
put, we consider the special case where all nodes
have the same parameters for waiting cost and for
transmission cost, that is, wn ≡ w and gn ≡ g for
all n. In this case, we have TˆA =
(I−1)(g/w)
I and
TˆB =
(J−1)(g/w)
J , and the price of anarchy on system
throughput is ( (I−1)(g/w)I +
(J−1)(g/w)
J +2)/2 ≤ 1+
g
w .
We now compute the average total costs of nodes.
The probability that a node ai∗ transmits a packet in
a round can be expressed as
Prob{min
i
tai < min
j
tbj}Prob{tai∗ < tai ,∀i 6= i
∗}
+ Prob{min
i
tai > min
j
tbj}Prob{tˆai∗ < tˆai ,∀i 6= i
∗}
=(
∑
i wai/gai
I − 1
−
wai∗
gai∗
)/(
∑
iwai/gai
I − 1
).
The average total cost of node ai∗ is then
wai∗ (TˆA + TˆB + 2)
+ gai∗ (
∑
i wai/gai
I − 1
−
wai∗
gai∗
)/(
∑
iwai/gai
I − 1
)
=gai∗ +
(J − 1)wai∗∑
j wbj/gbj
+ 2wai∗ . (18)
On the other hand, under our protocol, the down-
load rate of node ai∗ is at most one packet per 2 unit
times. Hence, the average total cost of node ai∗ is at
least 2wai∗ . We then have that the price of anarchy
on node cost of ai∗ is at most (
gai∗
wai∗
+ (J−1)∑
j wbj /gbj
+2)/2.
In the special case where wn ≡ w and gn ≡ g, for all
nodes,, the price of anarchy on node cost of ai∗ is at
most ( gw +
(J−1)(g/w)
J + 2)/2 ≤ 1 +
g
w .
We note that both the price of anarchy on system
throughput and the price of anarchy on node cost
increase with gw . Intuitively, when g is small com-
pared to w, nodes focus more on improving their
download rate than on reducing transmission cost.
Hence, nodes tend to choose small backoff timers
and result in small price of anarchy. On the other
hand, when g is much larger than w, transmission
costs become an important factor of nodes’ costs.
Hence, each node tends to choose large backoff
timers to increase its chance of becoming a free rider,
which results in large price of anarchy.
As a final remark, we note that both the sys-
tem throughput and total average costs of nodes
remain the same for all α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the
performance of the system is the same for all Nash
Equilibriums described by Theorem 2.
V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND CONVERGENCE
Section III has described a Nash Equilibrium for
a system with two files. However, for a node n to
derive its strategies, that is, to compute the values
of γn and λn, node n needs to know information of
the whole network, including the private values of
wm and gm for all other nodes m. In this section,
we propose a distributed mechanism for each node
to update its values of γn and λn only based on its
values of wn and gn and the history of the system. We
show that this mechanism is compatible to the node’s
incentive, in the sense that the updated γn and
λn achieve smaller average total cost for the node.
Moreover, we also show that the system converges
to a Nash Equilibrium when all nodes apply this
mechanism.
We order the two flies by lexicographical order. If
file A has higher order than B, we impose that γai =
0, for all i, and λbj = 0, for all j. This corresponds
to the case where α = 0 in Section III. Therefore,
in every round, a node in {b1, b2, . . . } transmits a
control packet in the initiation phase and a node in
{a1, a2, . . . } transmits a data packet in the response
phase. On the other hand, if file B has higher order
than A, we impose that λai = 0, for all i, and γbj = 0,
for all j, which corresponds to the case where α = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that file A has
higher order than B.
Using (2), (3), (14) , we have that TˆA =
1∑
i
λai
=
I−1∑
i
wai
gai
, λai∗ =
1
TˆA
−
wai∗
gai∗
, TˆB =
J−1
∑
j
wbj
gbj
, and γbj∗ =
1
TˆB
−
wbj∗
gbj∗
at the Nash Equilibrium, where I and J
are the number of nodes in groups {a1, a2, . . . } and
{b1, b2, . . . }, respectively. As we set α = 0, TˆA is the
average backoff time in the response phase, and TˆB
is that in the initiation phase.
We now introduce our mechanism for a node ai∗ .
Node ai∗ first guesses that the average amount of
backoff time in the response phase is Tˆai∗ ,0, and
sets λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,0
−
wai∗
gai∗
. Node ai∗ then observes the
system behaviors and updates its value of λai∗ every
M rounds. When ai∗ updates λai∗ the k
th time, it
computes the average backoff time in the response
phase since it last updates its values, denoted by
TˆA,k−1. Node ai∗ then sets Tˆai∗ ,k so that
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
=
1
Tˆai∗ ,k−1
− δk(
1
TˆA,k−1
−
1
Tˆai∗ ,k−1
),
and λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
, where the values of δk are
chosen so that
∑∞
k=1 δk = ∞ and
∑∞
k=1 δ
2
k < ∞.
For example, one can choose δk =
ǫ
k , where ǫ is a
small constant. The mechanism for a node bj∗ can
be derived similarly. The only difference is that node
bj∗ updates its value of γbj∗ based on the average
backoff time in the initiation phase.
As described in the following theorems, this mech-
anism has two important features. First, this mecha-
nism is compatible to the node’s incentive. Second,
this mechanism converges to a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 3: Fix the values of γn and λn, for all
n 6= ai∗, such that γai = 0, for all i, and λbj = 0, for
all j. The average total cost of node ai∗ is smaller
when it sets λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
, than when it sets
λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
, for all k.
Proof: Since we impose γai∗ = 0, node ai∗
has no control on the amount of backoff time in
the initiation phase. Hence, it suffices to show that
setting λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
achieves smaller average
additional total cost in the response phase than
setting λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
.
We have TˆA,k =
1
∑
i6=i∗ λai∗+(
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
)
, and gai∗ −
wai∗∑
i6=i∗
λai∗
=
gai∗∑
i6=i∗
λai∗
( 1
TˆA,k
− 1
Tˆai∗ ,k
). By (1), if
gai∗ −
wai∗∑
i6=i∗ λai∗
> 0, the expected additional cost
of ai∗ strictly decreases with the backoff timer of
ai∗ , t. Moreover, if gai∗ −
wai∗∑
i6=i∗ λai∗
> 0, we have
Tˆai∗ ,k > TˆA,k and Tˆai∗ ,k < Tˆai∗ ,k+1. For every
positive constant C, Prob(t < C) is smaller when
λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
than when λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
. Therefore, the average additional total cost
is smaller when λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
than when
λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
.
On the other hand, if gai∗ −
wai∗∑
i6=i∗
λai∗
< 0, the
expected additional cost of ai∗ strictly increases
with the backoff timer of ai∗ , t. Moreover, if gai∗ −wai∗∑
i6=i∗
λai∗
> 0, we have Tˆai∗ ,k < Tˆai∗ ,k+1, and, for ev-
ery positive constant C, Prob(t < C) is larger when
λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
than when λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
.
Therefore, the average additional total cost is also
smaller when λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k+1
−
wai∗
gai∗
than when
λai∗ =
1
Tˆai∗ ,k
−
wai∗
gai∗
.
Theorem 4: Fix the values of γn and λn, for all
n 6= bj∗, such that γai = 0, for all i, and λbj = 0,
for all j. The average total cost of node bj∗ becomes
smaller when it updates its γbj∗ .
Proof: The proof is very similar to that of The-
orem 3, and is hence omitted.
Next, we show that our mechanism converges to
the Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 5: If all nodes apply the proposed mech-
anism, then the value of TˆA,k and TˆB,k after each
node updates k times converge to TˆA =
I−1∑
i
wai
gai
and
TˆB =
J−1
∑
j
wbj
gbj
, respectively, as k →∞.
Proof: We only prove that TˆA,k converges to TˆA.
Under our mechanism, the value of λai after node
ai updates k times is
λai =
1
Tˆai,k
−
wai
gai
=(1 + δk)
1
Tˆai,k−1
− δk
1
TˆA,k−1
−
wai
gai
=(1 + δk)λai,k−1 − δk(
1
TˆA,k−1
−
wai
gai
),
and hence
1
TˆA,k
=
∑
i
λai
= (1 + δk)(
∑
i
λai,k−1)− δk(
I
TˆA,k−1
−
∑
i
wai
gai
)
=
1
TˆA,k−1
+ δk(I − 1)(
1
TˆA
−
1
TˆA,k−1
).
As we have
∑
k δk = ∞ and
∑
k δ
2
k < ∞,
1
TˆA,k
converges to 1
TˆA
.
VI. NASH EQUILIBRIUMS FOR MULTIPLE FILE
EXCHANGES WITH NETWORK CODING
In this section, we derive the Nash Equilibriums
for systems that incorporate network coding and
have more than two files. We use IA, IB , IC , . . . to
denote the number of nodes that need A,B,C, . . . ,
respectively. We will show that there exist a Nash
Equilibrium where each node n chooses each of
its backoff timers in both phases as an exponential
random variable. A lot of derivations in this section
are similar to those in Section III. Hence, we omit
some details and only report the major results in this
section due to space limit.
We first consider the nodes’ strategies in the re-
sponse phase. Assume that a node n with Xn = X
has sent the control packet in the initiation phase.
Each node m with Xm 6= X secretly and randomly
chooses a backoff timer tˆm ∼ EXP (λm|X). Note that
the value of λm|X may depend on X. Let m0 be the
node that chooses the smallest value of tˆm. Then,
m0 will transmit a data packet of X after tˆm0 time.
After m0 transmits the data packet, n will transmit a
coded packet that contains one packet from each of
the files except X, and every node m with Xm 6= X
can decode one packet from the transmission from
n. Similar to the derivations of (2), we can show
that, at a Nash Equilibrium, we have
λm|X =
1∑
Y :Y 6=X IY − 1
∑
l:Xl 6=X
wl
gl
−
wm
gm
, (19)
for all m such that Xm 6= X.
Next, we consider the nodes’ strategies in the
initiation phase. Assume that each node n chooses
a backoff timer tn ∼ EXP (γn). Let ΓX :=∑
n:Xn=X
γn. Similar to the derivations of (9), (10),
and (12), we have that, at a Nash Equilibrium:
wn
gn
=
ΓXn − γn
1− (
∑
X:X 6=Xn
ΓX)
∑
X:X 6=Xn
IX−1
∑
m:Xm 6=Xn
wm/gm
, (20)
for all n, and
IX − 1∑
n:Xn=X
wn/gn
ΓX+
∑
Y :Y 6=X IY − 1∑
m:Xm 6=X
wm/gm
∑
Y :Y 6=X
ΓY = 1,
(21)
for all X. (21) represents a series of linear equations
where both the number of unknowns, {ΓX}, and
the number of equations equal to the number of
files. We can use standard techniques for solving
linear equations to obtain a solution of {ΓX} to
(21). We can then use {ΓX} to obtain the values of
{γn} through (20). The derived {γn} forms a Nash
Equilibrium.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present our simulation results. We first
consider a system with two files, A and B, and
20 nodes. We assume that there are 10 nodes that
possess file A and need file B, and the other 10
nodes possess B and need A. We set gn = 1 for
all n, and wn is uniformly distributed in [1, 2]. Each
node applies the distributed mechanism introduced
in Section V to update its strategy. Each node n sets
Tˆn,0 =
99
100(wn/gn)
, that is, it guesses that there are
100 nodes in its group, an overestimate by a factor of
10, and all nodes in its group have the same values of
wn and gn as itself. Also, each node sets δk = 0.1/k.
Fig. 2 shows the resulting per-node throughput
after each update. It can be shown that, even though
the initial strategies of nodes are far from the
Nash Equilibrium, the per-node throughput under
our mechanism converges to the Nash Equilibrium
very quickly. With just three updates, the per-node
throughput is about 85% of that under the Nash
Equilibrium.
Next, we consider systems that have more than
two files and employ network coding. We assume
that, for each file, there are ten nodes that need
it. Therefore, there are a total number of 10 ×
{number of files} nodes in the system. We also set
gn = 1 for all nodes, and wn uniformly distributed in
[1, 2]. We use the procedure described in Section VI
to derive the values of γn and λn for all n, based on
which we calculate the per-node throughput under
a Nash Equilibrium.
Fig. 3 shows the per-node throughput under vari-
ous numbers of files in the system. We compare the
performance of our protocol against the maximum
Fig. 2: Per-node throughput with two files.
Fig. 3: Per-node throughput with multiple files and
network coding.
possible per-node throughput when network coding
is not employed and when all nodes are cooperative.
Without network coding, each transmission only
contains one packet of one file. Hence, the maximum
possible per-node throughput is 1/{number of files}.
Fig. 3 shows that, when there are only three files in
the system, our protocol has slightly worse per-node
throughput than the case when network coding is
not employed and all nodes are cooperative. This is
because our protocol considers the selfish behaviors
of nodes and the times spent on the two phases
of backoffs, while the compared scenario assumes
all nodes are cooperative and hence there is no
time spent on backoffs. However, as the number
of files increases, the benefits of network coding
outweigh the prices of anarchy. As a result, our
protocol achieves better per-node throughput than
the scenario where network coding is not employed
and all nodes are cooperative.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the problem of content distri-
bution over wireless P2P networks. We have pro-
posed a model that considers both the broadcast
nature of wireless transmissions and the incentives
of nodes. Based on the mode, a protocol for con-
tent distribution has been designed. The protocol
encourages nodes to contribute to the network and is
non-monetary. We have studied the performance of
our protocol when all nodes are selfish. For systems
with only two files, we have demonstrated that there
are closed-form expressions for Nash Equilibriums
and prices of anarchy. We have also proposed a
distributed mechanism where all nodes update their
strategies only based on their respective private
information and the history of the system. We have
provided numerical results that show that this mech-
anism converges to Nash Equilibriums very quickly.
For systems with more than two files, we propose
a simple extension of our protocol to incorporate
network coding. We then describe a procedure to
compute each node’s strategy under a Nash Equilib-
rium. Numerical results show that our protocol may
achieve better performance than scenarios where
nodes are cooperative but do not employ network
coding.
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